Prior research by Kaplan and Miller (1978) suggested that juries are generally influenced less by extralegal, biasing information than individual jurors are. A social decision scheme (SDS) analysis of this question by Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1997) suggested (a) that Kaplan and Miller's conclusion should hold only for relatively extreme legal cases (i.e., cases where the probability of conviction, without biasing information, was either very high or very low) and (b) that the opposite pattern should hold for moderate cases (with moderate conviction rates)-i.e., juries should show even greater sensitivity to biasing information than should individual jurors. An experiment is reported that compared juror vs jury sensitivity to biasing information (viz., prejudicial pretrial publicity) for versions of a legal case with a moderate and an extreme conviction rate. Consistent with the SDS analysis, juries were more biased than jurors for the moderate-case version, but the reverse was true for the extreme-case version. The implications of these findings and the more general utility of the SDS model for studying group processes are discussed. ᭧
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There are many ways to gauge the success of a scientific theory. The contributions to this special issue document some of the varied ways in which one theoretical approach, the social decision scheme (SDS) model, introduced some 25 years ago by James H. Davis (Davis, 1973) , has succeeded. One such yardstick is a theory's success in stimulating scholars to do research on new and interesting problems. Our task in this paper is to present a study which illustrates just such a recent application of the SDS model.
The present research grew out of a 1978 paper by Martin Kaplan and Lynn Miller (Kaplan & Miller, 1978) . Kaplan and Miller asked whether jurors are more or less likely than juries to be biased by legally irrelevant factors, such as a defendant's race or physical appearance, an attorney's accent, and so forth. Using Norman Anderson's information integration theory, they reasoned that deliberating jurors would share information that had not been initially incorporated into each and every member's judgment. Thus, when a given member incorporated information that had previously been ignored, and if this information possessed an incrimination value different than that of the biasing information, the subsequent judgment would be shifted away from the incrimination value of the extralegal evidence and toward the value of the trial evidence. Hence, the process of jury deliberation would lead to relatively less weight being placed on extralegal, biasing information and relatively more weight on the appropriate information-that is, on the trial evidence itself. This line of reasoning predicts that juries will, on average, be less biased than individual jurors. In one experiment (Kaplan & Miller, 1978 , Experiment 3), they varied information which jurors should, ideally, ignore-the behavioral style of the contending attorneys, or what they termed the relative "obnoxiousness of the attorneys." In one condition, it was the defense attorney who acted obnoxiously. He did this in various ways-by repetitively asking the same questions, by being long-winded, by taking a long time to sum up, and so forth. Jurors had been led to expect that the trial portion would take no more than 20 min; in the "obnoxious condition" it actually took about 45 min, no small source of annoyance. In short, the defense attorney's style and length of presentation were likely to be irritating to the mock jurors who (like real jurors) wanted to get their job done and get on with their lives. In another condition, it was the prosecuting attorney who acted obnoxiously. It is important to note that the evidence presented was the same in both conditions-what was varied was how the evidence was presented, not what evidence ultimately was presented to the jurors.
As expected, jurors improperly took attorney's style into account in deciding on the defendant's guilt (see Fig. 1 ). Plotted on the left side of the figure is the mean rated guiltiness of the defendant by individual jurors. Actually, Kaplan and Miller had two versions of their case, one with very strong evidence against 72 KERR, NIEDERMEIER, AND KAPLAN Kaplan and Miller (1978, Experiment 3) .
FIG. 1. Results from
the defendant (which we call the strong case-see the figure) and a second version which had very weak evidence against the defendant (which we call the weak case). However, attorney obnoxiousness had the same biasing effect for both cases (see Fig. 1 ). Kaplan and Miller (1978) then had their mock jurors deliberate the cases in 12-person mock juries. Immediately after this deliberation, they again had jurors rate the guiltiness of the defendant. They found a couple of things of interest when they compared pre-vs postdeliberation judgments. First, group discussion had its usual polarizing effect (cf. Myers & Lamm, 1976 )-when the case was strong and most jurors thought the defendant was guilty, they were even more extreme in their judgment of guilt after group deliberation. Likewise, discussion led to comparable polarization in the other direction for the weak case (see Fig. 1 ; cf. Myers & Kaplan, 1976) . This was in accord with the averaging model underlying the prediction of a debiasing effect of deliberation (Kaplan & Miller, 1978) ; in this instance, adding univalent information to each member's information pool would shift the response from an initially more moderate response, made in the absence of task information. But the second and, for us, more interesting result was that the obnoxiousness of the attorneys' behavior had relatively less effect on guilt ratings after deliberation than before deliberation. This was true both for the strong case and for the weak case (see Fig. 1 ).
Kaplan and Miller were considering for juries what is a much more general question-are individual or groups relatively more susceptible to judgmental biases? This is a question ripe for an SDS analysis. Kramer (1996a, 1996b) recently carried out such an analysis. The SDS model permits precise predictions of what groups will decide if we know two things-what individuals decide and the operative social decision scheme, which summarizes (in matrix form) the group decision-making process. For juries deciding between guilt and innocence in a criminal trial, there are now many studies (see Davis, 1980; Stasser, Kerr, & Bray, 1982; Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989 ) that suggest what that decision scheme looks like. It is a high-order majority primary scheme (e.g., if as many as two thirds of the jurors in a jury initially agree on a verdict, that will be the jury's ultimate verdict), with an asymmetric subscheme (i.e., when jurors are closely divided at the start of deliberation, factions favoring acquittal are somewhat more likely to prevail than factions favoring conviction-a pattern ultimately attributable to the law's injunction to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubts; see MacCoun & Kerr, 1988) .
What should the effect of such a decision scheme be on the magnitude of juror bias? Suppose we contrast two conditions, a "high-bias" condition and a "low-bias" condition, which differ in the availability of biasing information. For example, we might think of the obnoxious defense attorney condition as the high-bias condition and the obnoxious prosecutor condition as the low-bias condition. . One could then check whether the difference between these conditions at the group level was greater or smaller than it was for individuals-that is, whether bias was greater or smaller among juries than it was among jurors.
In a recent theoretical paper (Kerr et al., 1996a) , those calculations were done for all possible levels of individual bias (i.e., for all possible p High bias , p Low bias combinations). In Fig. 2 one can see illustrative results.
[Actually, what the figure shows is the results for a simple majority decision scheme (i.e., initial majority wins), without what Davis (e.g., 1973 ) has called the defendantprotection norm and others (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988) have called the leniency bias; we will note how this simplification might make some difference as we go along.] The two axes in this plane represent the conviction rates for the high-and low-bias conditions. The area above the diagonal area represents all possible combinations of p High bias , p Low bias (where p High bias Ͼ p Low bias ). For most of this area, it turns out that the difference predicted by the SDS model at the group level (that is the degree of bias among groups, here symbolized by a capital B) is greater than the difference existing at the individual level (here referred to by lowercase b; see Fig. 2 )-that is, that groups will be more biased than individuals. You can understand this for some point in the heart of this region-e.g., p High bias ϭ .75 and p Low bias ϭ .25 (that is, when seeing the obnoxious defense attorney boosts convictions rates all the way up to 75% guilty vs only 25% guilty when the prosecutor is obnoxious). If the group decision process is one in which initial majorities win, and the two conditions being compared have a majority for conviction in one condition and a majority for acquittal in the other, you can intuit that an even higher percentage of juries should convict in the first condition and an even lower percentage should convict in the latter condition. The net effect would be a bigger bias among groups than among individuals, or, as the figure expresses it, that B Ͼ b.
However, there are also some configurations of juror bias (and hence, areas in Fig. 2 ) where the reverse is true, that is, where the majority-wins process reduces the magnitude of bias. This occurs when the conviction rates are extreme-that is, when conviction rates are very high or very low in both conditions. A simple way to understand why is to consider that if two conditions are both near one of the poles, and the effect of group discussion is to move them even further toward those poles, eventually both will start approaching the ends of the scale and will be "compressed" together, reducing the difference between them and, hence, the magnitude of bias. If you like, you can think about this as a kind of floor or ceiling effect.
We might note at this point that the effect of the asymmetry (give the defendant the benefit of the doubt) in juries is to enlarge this b Ͼ B region for weak cases (low values of p High bias and p Low bias ) and to shrink the other region (for very strong cases) somewhat. That means that this plot only approximates what we would expect for juries. Still, it provides a useful starting point. Now, recall that Kaplan and Miller (1978) manipulated the strength of evidence against a defendant. One of their cases had very strong evidence and the other had very weak evidence. That raises a question: Could the attenuation of bias they observed be because their cases fell into the "extreme" regions of Fig. 2 (i.e., where b Ͼ B)? If so, we might understand their results without requiring any assumption that the weight or amount of legal vs irrelevant information is changed when jurors deliberate. That is, it could well be that the attenuation of bias Kaplan and Miller observed is not a general effect of jury deliberation, but rather a consequence of a familiar majority-wins process coupled with the particular (extreme) cases they used.
This suggested a simple but crucial experiment. One could conceptually replicate Kaplan and Miller's study but include a nonextreme case, with a moderate rate of conviction among jurors, which should fall into the B Ͼ b region. Kaplan and Miller's theory predicts that one should get attenuation of bias in juries for all cases, extreme or moderate. The SDS analysis predicts that one should get an attenuation of bias for an extreme case, but accentuation of bias for the moderate case.
METHOD

Pretesting
We began with what we thought would be a simply achieved, preliminary step-to find (or construct) criminal trials that produced the desired baserates of conviction. We decided to use two cases, one with a moderate rate of conviction among jurors (say 50-60%, a bit above 50% due to the asymmetry effect mentioned earlier; let's call this the moderate case) and the other with an "extremely" low conviction rate (say 20-30%; let's call this the weak case). Then we needed to find some biasing information that had several properties: it should involve using legally irrelevant information; it should produce a clear biasing effect among jurors; it should, ideally, produce the same magnitude of bias for both the moderate and the weak case. However, this information should not produce too much bias, since this could undercut our predictions (e.g., make a moderate case without biasing information into a very extreme case with such information). Meeting all these requirements turned out not to be so easy. It took over 2 years of piloting to get appropriate experimental materials.
The final trial was based on a child molestation trial used by Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers (1995) , in which a male defendant was accused of undressing a 13-year-old boy. By varying the testimony of various witnesses, we were finally able to produce two versions of this trial which produced a moderate and a low rate of conviction in the absence of any biasing information. 3 We then developed two newspaper stories which provided damaging or exonerating information about the defendant. Such pretrial publicity is legally irrelevant and inadmissible at trial, but has been shown in much prior research to reliably 76 KERR, NIEDERMEIER, AND KAPLAN bias juror verdicts (see Carroll et al., 1986 , or Otto, Penrod, & Dexter, 1994 . In the high-bias condition, the newspaper article alleged that the defendant had been kicked out of a "Big Brother" program for some unspecified "inappropriate" behavior toward his "little brother." In the low-bias condition, the newspaper article alleged that the defendant had received a commendation from the same Big Brother program and included a glowing testimonial from his little brother's mother.
Participants
The participants were 360 undergraduate students (94 males, 266 females) who received partial course credit for their participation. Of these, 320 served on 80 four-person mock juries; the remaining 40 participants provided only predeliberation data.
Design and Procedure
The main study was a simple 2 ϫ 2 factorial, with Case (Moderate vs Weak) and Bias (High vs Low) as the between-Ss factors. Participants were scheduled in groups of 4-20 persons; because everyone serving in each jury in each session had to be exposed to the same experimental materials, sessions were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Participants were told that they would consider a brief summary of an actual trial. The alleged goal of the experiment was to compare the verdicts of actual jurors and of mock jurors who considered only a written summary of the facts of the case. Mock jurors first read one version of the pretrial publicity, allegedly to make their experience as much like the real jurors' as possible. Then they read either the moderate or the weak case, followed by standard judge's instructions (including description of the presumption of innocence, the reasonable doubt standard of proof, etc.). It is important to note that these instructions included the usual judicial admonition not to consider anything other than the evidence itself (e.g., publicity presented in the media and not in the courtroom) when deciding on their verdict. At this point, participants made several judgments: a dichotomous juror verdict (guilty vs not guilty), ratings of the confidence in this verdict, the probability of the defendant's guilt, and (momentarily taking on the role of trial judge) a recommended prison term (if the defendant were convicted) between 0 and 20 years.
We randomly created as many four-person mock juries as possible. Participants left over after these groups had been created were given an alternative task to perform while the mock juries deliberated. Each mock jury had 15 min to deliberate the case and to try to reach a unanimous verdict. After deliberation, the former jury members individually provided the same judgments they had made prior to deliberation as well as a number of additional ones, viz., estimates of subjective standards of proof, evaluations of the defendant, sympathy for the defendant and victim, and several checks on participants' memory for content of the pretrial publicity they had seen. Analyses of the last checks indicated clear and appropriate recognition of the content of the publicity sheet seen in the high-and low-bias conditions, p Ͻ .0001 for each of three items.
RESULTS
Predeliberation
Following Kaplan and Miller's (1978) analytic approach and to provide a more sensitive, multichotomous alternative to the simple dichotomous verdict, the verdict and 11-point rating of confidence in verdict were combined to create a new guilt rating which ranged from 1 (maximum confidence in a not-guilty verdict) to 11 (minimal confidence in a not-guilty verdict) to 12 (minimal confidence in a guilty verdict) to 22 (maximum confidence in a guilty verdict).
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Jurors' predeliberation guilt ratings were analyzed in a 2 (Case) ϫ 2 (Bias) analysis of variance. This analysis resulted in two main effects: the guilt ratings were higher (mean ϭ 13.23) in the moderate case than in the weak case (mean ϭ 9.54), F(1, 353) ϭ 22.15, p Ͻ .001, and they were higher in the highbias condition (i.e., with publicity damaging to the defendant; mean ϭ 12.05) than in the low-bias condition (i.e., with pretrial publicity favorable to the defendant; mean ϭ 10.48), F(1, 353) ϭ 4.66, p Ͻ .035. The interaction effect was not significant (F(1, 353) ϭ .078, ns).
Of course, it was important for our purposes not only that each factor independently affected verdict judgments, but that the resulting conviction rates fell into the theoretically crucial regions. Examination of the dichotomous predeliberation verdicts spoke to this requirement. The observed overall conviction rate for the moderate case (57% guilty) was just about at the desired level, just a bit above the maximally moderate 50% baseline. 5 The weak case produced an overall conviction rate of 34%, significantly ( p Ͻ .001) lower than the conviction rate for the moderate case. This conviction base rate was somewhat higher than we wanted, ideally, but was still workable for purposes of comparison with the moderate case.
The bias factor produced an overall difference of 8% in conviction rates between the high-and low-bias conditions (marginally significant, p Ͻ .08, for the analyses of dichotomous verdicts, but as noted above, clearly significant for the guilt ratings, p Ͻ .035). More importantly, this effect was comparable for both the moderate and the weak case (Case ϫ Bias F(1, 353) ϭ .014, ns). Thus, exposure to the pretrial publicity had a consistent biasing effect in both cases, detectable but not so strong as to move the conviction rates out of the targeted moderate and (relatively) extremely low ranges of conviction rates.
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Effects of Jury Deliberation on Bias
Kaplan and Miller (1978) compared pre-and postdeliberation guilt judgments. Changes in positions expressed within group discussion are usually attenuated following group discussion (cf. Kerr, 1981; Pruitt, 1971 ), due to partial or complete reversion to predeliberation opinion. Thus, analysis of prevs postdeliberation judgments was a fairly-conservative analytic method for our current purposes (since, if anything, postdeliberation judgments tend to underestimate changes observed at the group level). In any case, comparison of predeliberation with jury verdict data (rather than with postdeliberation juror data) leads to the same conclusions, as we shall see.
For these analyses, given the potential nonindependence of responses of members of the same jury (cf. Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) , juries (and not individual jurors) were the replicates and units of analyses. Thus, whenever dependent variables were assessed separately for individual jury members (e.g., pre-or postdeliberation verdicts or guilt ratings), these scores were averaged across the four jury members to determine a jury score.
The methods of analyses were to conduct 2 (Case: Moderate vs Weak) ϫ 2 (Bias: High vs Low) ϫ 2 (Testing: Predeliberation vs Jury/postdeliberation) analyses of variance with repeated measures on the last factor. Kaplan and Miller's (1978) theoretical model predicts a Bias ϫ Testing interaction, such that bias is smaller after deliberation than before. The SDS analysis predicts a three-way interaction effect, such that bias will be accentuated after jury deliberation for the moderate case but will be relatively weaker after deliberation for the weak case. If the weak case is sufficiently extreme (i.e., overall conviction rates are sufficiently low), for the weak case we should see the attenuation of bias observed by Kaplan and Miller (1978) .
The first such analysis was for the pre-and postdeliberation mean jury guilt ratings (corresponding to Kaplan & Miller's, 1978, original analysis) . Besides the relatively uninteresting Case main effect ( p Ͻ .001), the only other significant effect was the 3-way interaction, F(1, 76) ϭ 8.93, p Ͻ. 005. (Note that the Bias ϫ Testing effect predicted by Kaplan and Miller's model was nonsignificant, F(1, 76) ϭ .49, ns.) The means for the three-way interaction are plotted in Fig. 3a . As the figure shows, the predeliberation biasing effect of pretrial publicity (around 1.5 points for both the moderate and the weak case) was affected differently by group deliberation. It was accentuated postdeliberation in the moderate case (to a bias simple effect of 4.45) and wholly eliminated postdeliberation in the weak case (to Ϫ.16).
A parallel analysis on pre-and postdeliberation verdicts exhibited a similar pattern. Besides the theoretically uninteresting case ( p Ͻ .003) and testing ( p Ͻ .04; conviction rates were generally lower postdeliberation) main effects, the only other significant effect was the three-way interaction effect, F(1, 76) ϭ 8.21, p Ͻ .006. (Again, the Bias ϫ Testing interaction was not significant, F(1, 76) ϭ .17, ns.) The pattern of the verdict data, plotted in Fig. 3b , shows the same pattern as we observed in the guilt rating data-deliberation accentuated bias (nearly tripling it, from 10.9% predeliberation to 28.7% postdeliberation) for the moderate case, but attenuated it (from 9.9% to Ϫ3%) for the weak case.
Finally, to show that the same pattern was obtained if we focused on actual jury verdicts rather than postdeliberation verdicts, we did the same analyses comparing predeliberation juror verdicts (averaged within juries) with jury verdicts. To do this analysis, some recoding was required for the approximately one quarter (21/80 or 26.3%) of juries that hung (i.e., were unable to reach unanimous agreement in the 15 min provided for deliberation). 7 In the analyses presented here, we applied well-replicated jury decision schemes (e.g., Davis, 1980; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Stasser et al., 1982) to predict the eventual outcome for hung juries from their postdeliberation distribution of verdict preferences. Specifically, we assumed that hung juries that ended deliberation with only one holdout for acquittal would have eventually convicted (had they sufficient deliberation time), whereas those hung juries with two or more favoring acquittal would have eventually acquitted; alternative forms of recoding 8 did not change the pattern of results. Here, the significant effects were the case ( p Ͻ .006) and testing ( p Ͻ .002) main effects and the (by now familiar) three-way interaction (F(1, 76) ϭ 5.16, p Ͻ .03) (but again, not the Bias ϫ Testing interaction, F(1, 76) ϭ .69, ns). As Fig. 3c shows, juries considering the moderate case showed a larger bias effect (21.3%) than they had as individual predeliberation jurors (10.9%), whereas juries considering the weak case exhib- ited a smaller bias effect (3.4%) than they had done as jurors prior to deliberation (9.9%).
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The pattern of shifts following deliberation follows the SDS model prediction that biasing effects would be exaggerated in the moderate case but reduced in extreme cases. The former does not accord with Kaplan and Miller's information-integration expectation that deliberation about the relevant case facts would increase the amount of case information incorporated into judgment, thereby decreasing the impact of irrelevant bias. But the moderate case differs from extreme cases not only in strength of guilt appearance, but also in containing evidence that is balanced, or mixed in incrimination and exoneration value. If discussion brought out the ambiguous and flawed nature of the evidence, juries might have discussed the evidence less thoroughly than in the extreme case, thereby failing to incorporate additional relevant evidence after discussion, and consequently relying on the biasing news account more than had they not discussed the case. Thus, attaching less weight to the ambiguous trial evidence relative to the news accounts could have produced the observed increase in the impact of bias. To test this possibility, the content of deliberations was analyzed to see whether a more restricted (or a more biased) sample of the evidence was discussed in the moderate compared to the weak case. For each case, all evidential facts were identified and listed according to whether they were pro-defendant (e.g., the victim did not see the perpetrator's face) or pro-prosecution (e.g., the defendant had a knife with a 5-in. blade). For the moderate case, there were 13 pro-defendant and 6 pro-prosecution facts, and for the weak case, the corresponding numbers of facts were 19 and 7, respectively. Mention of each listed piece of evidence was identified in each taped deliberation by two coders, working jointly, and the proportion of available facts of each type that were mentioned was calculated. Analyses of variance were conducted on the proportion of trial evidence that was mentioned in deliberation for prodefendant evidence, pro-prosecution evidence, and total evidence, with case type (weak or moderate) and biasing article (strong or weak) as independent variables. The absence of significant effects in all instances indicated that the increase in the bias effect in the moderate case could not be explained by a more impoverished discussion of trial evidence.
DISCUSSION
The findings and methods of this paper have interesting implications for jury behavior, in particular, and for the study of group decision making, more generally. For the jury, our findings confirm what is evident in the empirical record (see Kerr et al., 1996a , for a review)-that there is probably no general answer to the question "which is more biased, jurors or juries?" The answer to this question must be "it depends." But the SDS model, like any good theory, gives us insight into exactly what it depends on, and why. That model predicts and here we have shown that the answer depends crucially on a certain task feature-the extremity of conviction rates among individual jurors. In this regard, these findings are very congenial to what McGrath (1984) has dubbed the "Illinois school" of small group research, the geographic and intellectual birthplace of the social decision scheme model (as well as much other influential work on small group processes). Once again, as prominent members of this school such as Davis, Hackman, Komorita, Laughlin, McGrath, and Steiner have told us repeatedly, one's conclusions about group process need to carefully consider the nature of the task groups face.
The contrast of individual vs group decision in legal decision making has been a central question in the history of psychology and the law. For example, Kalven and Zeisel's (1966) classic text on the jury took as its primary empirical focus the differences between verdicts preferred by individual judges and by juries. A few scholars (e.g., Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994) have concluded (from isolated and equivocal findings, in our judgment) that juries can generally be counted on to be less responsive to biasing information than are jurors. Our current findings suggest that such conclusions are, at best, premature. Although the jury is, in many ways, a remarkably effective decision-making agent, both theory and data now suggest that eliminating sensitivity to irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial, or otherwise biasing information is not among its invariable virtues. Kaplan and Miller (1978) hypothesized that juries process available information (at least quantitatively) differently than do individual jurors. This is an intriguing suggestion that our present findings have not ruled out, at least not under some conditions of interest. For example, it may be that the inappropriateness of using certain biasing information is, in Laughlin and Ellis's (1986) language, demonstrably correct. That is, jurors may share a conceptual system which, if appealed to during jury deliberation, makes it evident to all that certain information should not (or, at times, should) be used in reaching a verdict. For example, in some juror populations, it may be demonstrably correct that a defendant's race should not influence any juror's decision making. And if at least some jurors assert this demonstrably correct position (and if jurors are aware of the risk of bias, and want to avoid it; cf. Devine, 1989) , then other work utilizing the SDS model (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) would suggest-consistent with Kaplan and Miller (1978) -that such consensually defined "truth" will prevail in the jury and consequently, that the jury will be less susceptible to that (specific) bias. Thus, jury discussion could promote an active discounting of bias by introduction of antibias norms, as well as passive bias reduction by increasing the amount of relevant evidence, or by attention to such evidence via deliberation (Kaplan & Miller, 1978 , Experiments 1 and 2). Such possibilities deserve careful attention. In the meantime, parsimony (and our findings) recommends presuming only those differences in information processing between jurors and juries that available data require (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, in press ).
More generally, the SDS analysis leads to a similar conclusion for any decision-making group (not just the jury)-the relative susceptibility of individuals vs groups to judgmental biases will depend on a variety of task, group, and group member factors (Kerr et al., 1996a (Kerr et al., , 1996b . Most importantly, it can easily be shown that the result of this contrast depends upon the process of group decision making. For example, suppose that instead of operating under a decision-making process that gave larger factions disproportionate influence (e.g., majority-wins), juries operated under a process where faction size was irrelevant. Under these assumptions, the pattern predicted and observed here would have been reversed-that is, jury deliberation would have attenuated bias for moderate cases and accentuated bias for extreme cases (see Kerr et al., 1996a ). The SDS model similarly implicates such factors as group size, type of bias, and magnitude of bias as important moderating factors. The present study provides the first direct (and successful) empirical test of one of the many predictions that follow from this SDS analysis; the others await direct tests.
In this paper we have applied the SDS model to one question (viz., the relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to judgmental bias) for one type of group (viz., the jury). However, the SDS model's utility is hardly restricted to this question and this group. It provides a very general and powerful tool for description, prediction, and analysis of the behavior of many decision-making and problem-solving groups or organizations (for illustrations, see Baron, Kerr, & Miller, 1992; Davis, 1980; Kerr, Stasser, & Davis, 1979; Laughlin, 1980; Stasser et al., 1982 Stasser et al., , 1989 . Essentially, nearly any task for which both individuals and groups generate commensurate products can be analyzed using SDS.
It also has all the special virtues of a formal mathematical model (Abelson, 1968; Rosenberg, 1968) . These virtues include the inherent internal consistency of its mathematics (in SDS's case, probability theory and matrix algebra), fairly explicit assumptions (Harris, 1976) , and the ability to make point or distributional predictions (rather than just ordinal predictions; cf. Meehl, 1990 ). The SDS model also lends itself readily to simulation, or what Davis (e.g., Davis & Kerr, 1986) terms "thought experimentation," wherein the implications of certain variables can be thoroughly explored theoretically before the very laborious and expensive step of observing task groups is taken. For example, Kerr et al.'s (1996a) simulations suggested that the extremity of conviction rate could well be a key moderating variable for explaining the best extant evidence for the bias-reducing power of juries (viz., Kaplan & Miller, 1978) . This suggestion has been borne out in the present study. (See Kerr & MacCoun, 1985 , for another such illustration).
On the other hand, the SDS model is also sufficiently flexible and openended to be applied to a very wide range of task groups (of different sizes, facing different tasks, with different group structures, etc.). Although one can construct, test, and confirm (or disconfirm) social decision scheme matrices that embody very specific group processes, the SDS model can also be used as a descriptive tool, whereby regularities and discontinuities in the ways groups combine their members' resources or preferences to forge a group product can be recognized and more general principles may be induced (Kerr et al., 1979) .
The original (and most widely applied) version of the SDS model (Davis, 1973) had a number of potential limitations. It could only be applied to tasks with discrete and relatively few decision alternatives; hence, it could not be practically applied to decision making on continuous dimensions (e.g., damage awards by juries). It assumed that group members were distinguishable only in terms of their preferences; hence, it made no provision for individual differences in persuasiveness, commitment, distinctiveness, etc. And it was essentially a product model, using the input to group deliberation (e.g., member preferences) to predict the output of group action (e.g., the group's preference); hence, only by inference did it probe the dynamic process of group action. However, subsequent work has shown that these are not inherent limitations to SDS. It is quite possible to extend the original, basic model to continuous response dimensions (e.g., Davis, 1996; Hinsz, 1989 Hinsz, , 1999 , to groups where members differ in psychologically important ways (e.g., Kirchler & Davis, 1986) , and to more direct examination of interpersonal (e.g., Kerr, 1981 Kerr, , 1992 and intrapersonal (e.g., Stasser & Davis, 1981) decision-making processes.
Along with the virtues of a formal mathematical model, the SDS also may labor under some of such a model's drawbacks. One such drawback is that the mathematics might deter some investigators from applying the model (or its progeny) to their own substantive questions. If this has occurred, it is doubly unfortunate. First, because the basic concepts of the model are not complex or mired in mathematical formalism, but are quite simple (even to the uninitiated). And second, because employing tools with demonstrated utility often broadens the understanding of phenomena. Much has clearly been accomplished using the SDS model in its first 25 years. As more scholars become familiar with the model and its potential for application, the accomplishments of the next 25 years should be just as impressive.
